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1 
Felix Ekardt
*, Rostock / Germany 
 
Human Rights and Climate Policy – toward a New Concept of Freedom, 
Protection Rights, and Balancing 
 
Neither the scope of “protection obligations” which are based on fundamental rights nor the theory of 
constitutional balancing nor the issue of “absolute” minimum standards (fundamental rights nuclei, 
“Grundrechtskerne”), which have to be preserved in the balancing of fundamental rights, can be 
considered satisfactorily resolved–in spite of intensive, long-standing debates. On closer analysis, the 
common case law definitions turn out to be not always consistent. This is generally true and with 
respect  to  environmental  fundamental  rights  at  the  national,  European,  and  international  level. 
Regarding the theory of balancing, for the purpose of a clear balance of powers the usual principle of 
proportionality also proves specifiable. This allows a new analysis, whether fundamental rights have 
absolute  cores.  This  question  is  does  not  only  apply  to  human  dignity  and  the  German  Aviation 
Security Act, but even if environmental policy accepts death, e.g. regarding climate change. Overall, it 
turns out that an interpretation of fundamental rights which is more multipolar and considers the 
conditions for freedom more heavily–as well as the freedom of future generations and of people in 
other parts of the world–develops a greater commitment to climate protection. 
 
I. Misunderstandings about environmental fundamental rights, environmental national 
objectives, and sustainability – nationally and transnationally 
Climate change is coming faster and more drastic than expected. From the current perspective 
of scientists the issue is to have basically minus 95% greenhouse gases in the West and minus 
80% worldwide in 2050 to avoid a world suffering from huge economic damage, wars over 
resources, migration flows and millions of dead people.
1 As outlined in the cited reference, 
the existing international, European and national climate policy is far from reaching such 
reduction objectives and their effective enforcement, which is not frustrated by loopholes and 
computational tricks, even though there are (technical and legal) concepts for an appropriate 
response to the problem. Even an intensified unilaterally European (or in some aspects 
national) approach on climate protection would be possible if restrictive measures were 
combined with border adjustments for imports and exports and imports.
2 
                                                           
* Prof. Dr. Felix Ekardt, LL.M., M.A. is a professor of environmental law and philosophy of law at the 
University of Rostock and is heading an institute called Research Group Sustainability and Climate Policy in 
Leipzig (www.sustainability-justice-climate.eu). 
1 These introductory questions are not discussed here in detail as they have been treated several times. Cf., e.g., 
Ekardt, in: Pan Jiahua (Ed.), Climate Change and Budget Approach, 2012 (forthcoming). 
2 Cf. Ekardt/ Schmeichel, Critical Issues in Environmental Taxation 2009, 737 ff.  
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But may someone demand a more effective climate policy based on German, European 
and international fundamental rights?
3 Not in a sense that someone could found a claim for a 
specific control instrument on fundamental rights, but perhaps to increase the effectiveness of 
climate policy as a whole–though a significant leeway for the legislator remains. In principle 
all this concerns three separate legal spheres–national (in this example: German), European 
and international laws of fundamental and human rights. However, the following will show 
that the legal issues are the same on each level, at least with respect to substantive law. Thus, 
it appears justified to undertake a uniform analysis of fundamental rights. Any particularities 
will be indicated in every case. 
In general, the conflict over the right climate policy can be regarded as a conflict of 
competing interests and thus as a balancing problem. Balancing in a broader sense is a core 
issue  of  the  German  (and  European)  discussion  in  public  law  and  especially  between 
economic and environmental concerns.
4 It refers to a–if not the–fundamental phenomenon of 
law: to find a just balance of conflicting interests, no matter whether we call it jurisdiction 
over discretionary decisions, proportionality test, or simply balancing. For, ultimately, any 
application of the law must do justice to the conflicting spheres and guarantees of freedom of 
the  people  involved.  Thus,  all  this  can  therefore  be  traced  back  to  the  constitutional 
requirement that the legislature shall undertake a fair balancing of the conflicting interests. 
The framework for the legislative balancing is usually referred to as proportionality test. The 
administration is mainly determined by legislative acts and its balancing authority is initially 
(mostly) limited to the interpretation of the factual requirement of the standards which the 
legislature has enacted as an expression of its balancing (if those standards leave room for 
interpretation). The administration is more flexible where the legislature has not considered 
the respective interests so  far but  has  left  it partially for the administration to  decide.  In 
Germany,  this  is  called  discretion  (Ermessen)  or  (planning)  assessment  (planerische 
Abwägung). This concept applies cum grano salis regardless of the respective level of law 
(e.g.  national,  European  or  international  law).  Regarding  balancing  in  the  area  of 
environmental protection, not only economic freedom but also environmental protection itself 
must be considered (partly also) as an aspect of freedom and fundamental rights. This is 
certainly not a trivial statement but a rather controversial finding (if one pursues a challenging 
                                                           
3 For details on all aspects of this contribution, cf. Ekardt, Theorie der Nachhaltigkeit: Rechtliche, ethische und 
politische Zugänge – am Beispiel von Klimawandel, Ressourcenknappheit und Welthandel, 2d Ed. 2011, § 6; 
Ekardt, Information, Partizipation, Rechtsschutz. Prozeduralisierung von Gerechtigkeit und Steuerung in der 
Europäischen Union – unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Aarhus-Konvention, 2d Ed. 2010, §§ 1, 5. 
4 Cf. pars pro toto Erbguth, Juristenzeitung 2006, 484 ff.; Erbguth, Zur Vereinbarkeit der jüngeren 
Deregulierungsgesetzgebung im Umweltrecht mit dem Verfassungs- und Europarecht, 1999; Erbguth, 
Rechtssystematische Grundfragen des Umweltrechts, 1987.  
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concept of environmental protection) which requires closer investigation when the conformity 
of the existing climate policy with fundamental rights is analyzed. 
For  some  time  the  framework  for  any  discussion  about  environmental  has  been  the 
principle of sustainable development. Internationally, sustainability has ever more often been 
named a key objective of policy for 20 years, whether by the UN, the EU or the German 
Government. It is however not always taken very seriously. The intention of sustainability is 
to  extend  law/  morals/  politics  in  an  intergenerational  and  global  respect.
5  In contrast, a 
common understanding–also among lawyers–is that sustainability is simply a balanced pursuit 
of the three pillars of environmental, economic and social issues, if necessary even without a 
time- or space-spanning aspect.
6 It was the topic elsewhere that this is at least misleading, that 
it sticks to the demand for, in the full sense of the word, eternal (!) growth which –in  a 
physically  finite  world–cannot  be  fulfilled,  and  that  this  “pillar-perspective”  is  also 
incompatible with international law’s founding documents of sustainability.
7 
Fundamental rights issues take us to constitutional law in a functional sense, which also 
includes  European  and  international  “constitutional”  law.
8  Environmental  and  climate 
protection, however, is rarely addressed as guaranteed by fundamental rights, but is rather 
assigned to the category of “national objectives,” thus based on Article 20a of the German 
Constitution (Grundgesetz, GG) or, in European law, on Article 191 TFEU. Nevertheless, it 
seems  constitutionally  essential  to  consider  fundamental  rights.  The  interpretation  of 
fundamental  rights,  unlike  state  goals,  does  not  only  generate  power  but  also  legally 
enforceable obligations of the government. Furthermore, fundamental rights are the strongest 
element of a liberal-democratic constitution. Moreover, on a constitutional level, overcoming 
the economically oriented understanding of freedom could also be the essential desideratum 
of a more future and globally oriented (thus: sustainable) legal interpretation. By the way, 
restrictions in favor of environmental protection “for the sake of real people’s (conditions of) 
freedom”  (as  embodied  in  fundamental  rights)  might  also  be  motivationally  much  more 
plausible  than  the  usual,  fairly  misleading  antagonism  of  “self-development  versus 
environmental protection,” as latently affirmed by national objective provisions. 
                                                           
5 Cf. for this understanding of the principle of sustainability (and with references to opposing views) Ekardt, 
Theorie, § 1; Ekardt, Zeitschrift für Umweltpolitik und Umweltrecht 2009, 223 ff.; with a similar result (but 
somewhat differing arguments) cf. Appel, Staatliche Zukunfts- und Entwicklungsvorsorge, 2005; Ott/ Döring, 
Theorie und Praxis starker Nachhaltigkeit, 2004; Köck, Die Verwaltung 2007, 413 ff. 
6 Cf., e.g. Steinberg, Der ökologische Verfassungsstaat, 1998, S. 114; Beaucamp, Das Konzept einer 
zukunftsfähigen Entwicklung im Recht, 2002, S. 18 ff. 
7 Ekardt, in: Pan Jiahua, Climate Change (forthcoming); Ekardt, Zeitschrift für Umweltpolitik und Umweltrecht 
2009, 223 ff.; Ott/ Döring, Theorie, passim; partly also Appel, Zukunftsvorsorge, 339 ff.; Köck, Die Verwaltung 
2007, 413 ff.; cf. also (implicitly) Unnerstall, Rechte zukünftiger Generationen, 1999. 
8 On the controversy about statehood and the existence of a constitution, cf. recently Möllers, Der vermisste 
Leviathan, 2008.  
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Accordingly,  earlier–and  even  today  in  international  law–there  was  often,  or  is 
respectively,  a  discussion  about  environmental  fundamental  rights
9,  as  environmental 
fundamental rights or “climate fundamental rights” would mean a break with those traditional 
views  diagnosed  above.  In  the  academic  international  law  debate  (unlike  the  practice  of 
international  law),  the  idea  of  strong  or  even  absolute,  i.e.  not  subject  to  any  balancing, 
environmental  fundamental  rights  seems  to  gain  support.  In  national  debates,  however, 
environmental fundamental rights are considered non-specifiable and subject to balancing; 
therefore  ultimately  not  helpful.  Of  course,  the  vague  content  of  an  “environmental 
fundamental  right” would only result if one generally introduced a fundamental  right  “to 
environmental  protection”–or  more  specific  in  our  context:  “to  climate  protection.”  This, 
however, is not my intention here. I am only concerned with the question, whether a correct 
interpretation  of  fundamental  and  human  rights  (nationally  or  transnationally)  results  in 
greater levels of environmental protection than is often assumed. Such an interpretation would 
build on already existing fundamental rights, with the consequence that current climate policy 
might be in conflict with fundamental rights. Of course, even if the issue is within the scope 
of  a  fundamental  right,  the  problem  of  necessary  balancing  cannot  be  avoided.  But  this 
problem applies in precisely the same way to other fundamental rights as well (balancing is 
commonly called “proportionality test”). Therefore, the subject of the following analysis will 
not be true fundamental rights “to environmental protection.” At the same time, we will not 
limit ourselves to accepting the common assumption that basically all aspects of fundamental 
rights which concern environmental issues are covered by the right to life and health, which 
then (a) included no provision for preventive aspects, (b) de facto prefers the defensive aspect 
of the fundamental right to its “protection obligation” (supposedly because of further needs 
for balancing, separation of powers, etc.), and (c) for the rest fails to concretize environmental 
protection  which  would  be  required  to  render  it  practically  relevant.  It  is  precisely  this 
approach toward “protection obligations” (including its administrative consequences) that will 
be subject to criticism in the course of the following analysis. 
 
   
                                                           
9 For an outline of the common discussion, cf. Schmidt-Radefeldt, Ökologische Menschenrechte, 2000, 33 ff. 
and 40 ff.; cf. e.g. Steinberg, Verfassungsstaat, 421 ff. (explicitly criticizing „environmental fundamental 
rights“); Hattenberger, Der Umweltschutz als Staatsaufgabe, 1993, 77 ff.; Gibson, Saskatchewan Law Review 
1990, 5 ff.; Nickel, Yale Law Journal 1993, 281 (282); cf. e.g Kiss, in: Kromarek (Ed.), Environnement et droits 
de l’homme, 1987, 13 ff. (showing a more positive tendency); on the notion of „third generation human rights“ 
cf. e.g. Donnelly, in: Brölmann/ Lefeber/ Ziek (Ed.), Peoples and Minorities in International Law, 1993, 119 ff.  
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II. Fundamental rights against climate change–only subordinate and vague “protection 
obligations“? 
1. Problems of the existing case law 
It is well known that in particular the German constitutional
10 and administrative
11 courts are 
very  reluctant  to  recognize  e nvironmental  positions  based  on  fundamental  rights  and 
previously  rejected  corresponding  claims  for  violations  of  fundamental  rights  on 
environmental protection issues. They already avoid the term “protection rights” which would 
clarify that subjective, individual rights are concerned (even if they are subject to balancing 
with conflicting legal positions).
12 Especially (but not only) in constitutional law cases there is 
often not clear distinction between the tests of admissibility (Zulässigkeit) and subs tantive 
foundation of the claim (Begründetheit). Thus, eventually–camouflaging the question whether 
a subjective, individual right exists–it remains unclear, what the respective issue is: whether 
the claimant has an own right that allows him to bring an action (Beschwerdebefugnis), or 
whether  the  underlying  action  is  within  the  scope  of  the  respective  fundamental  right 
(Grundrechtsschutzbereich) or it is an issue of restrictions of the respective fundamental right 
(Grundrechtsschranken). In spite of the different results (compared to actions in the area of 
environmental issues of fundamental rights) this mainly applies even to abortion decisions.
13 
The basis for all this is the already mentioned idea that protection rights only describe a goal, 
but no exact scope of protection, and that one only has to examine whether the protective 
measures taken are obviously insufficient. However, the latter will always be denied, since in 
Germany some legislative efforts can be found for every subject, which then qualify as per se 
“not evidently insufficient.”
14 It will be elaborated later that both this result and its reasoning 
(which is in fact rather proclaimed and reasoned) might deserve criticism. 
From the outset, the ECJ case law is hardly devoted to the issue of protection rights as 
such–European  fundamental  rights  are  included  in  the  (since  the  Lisbon  Treaty  binding) 
Charter of Fundamental Rights (ECFR) and in Article 6, paragraph 1-3 EU
15. The ECJ has not 
                                                           
10 Cf. the basic decisions in German Federal Constitutional Court, Vol. 49 (BVerfGE 49, 89 (141)); Vol. 53, 30 
(57); Vol. 56, 54 ff.; this problem is ignored in Couzinet, DVBl 2008, S. 760 ff. (citing further academic 
literature which does no perceive this issue); but cf. Vosgerau, Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts 2008, 346 ff.; 
Schwabe, Juristenzeitung 2007, 134 ff. 
11 On the example of aircraft noise, cf. German Federal Administrative Court (BVerwG), NVwZ 2006, 1055 ff. 
12 A somewhat special case is nuclear law. Cf. lately, German Federal Administrative Court (BVerwG), Neue 
Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 2008, 1012. On a critical position, cf. Dolde, Neue Zeitschrift für 
Verwaltungsrecht 2009, 679 ff. Nevertheless, the reasoning oft he following statements also applies to this area 
of law. 
13 Cf. German Federal Constitutional Court, Vol. 39 (BVerfGE 39, 1; 88, 203). 
14 On the example of nuclear law, cf. lately German Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG), Beschl. v. 
29.07.2009, 1 BvR 1606/08, juris n. 19. 
15 On the former derivation of unwritten EU fundamental rights, cf. EuGHE 1970, 1125, n. 4; 1974, 491, n. 13. 
On the new legislation with an explicit ECFR, cf. Ekardt/ Kornack, ZEuS 2010, 111.  
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even specifically addressed fundamental protection rights against the community. Within the 
Member States, it recognizes the possibility of those rights.
16 Of course, to exaggerate only 
slightly, the ECJ structurally fails to do almost anything which could bind the EU in any way. 
It rather seems to be driven by the uns poken intention to give the EU Commission and 
Council plenty of rope in the determination of their policies. Thus the existing case law lacks 
any real reference points for the issues discussed in this article. Though the ECJ regularly 
requires Member States to comply with certain environmental requirements, this has nothing 
to do with the recognition of protection rights. It only refers to the fact that the Member States 
are obliged to effectively implement certain environmental decisions of the EU Commissi on, 
the Council and the Parliament. Thus, at its core, it is just an issue of enforcement of simple 
(not constitutional) European law; and it also completely unrelated to the precise content of 
that law. Protection rights, however, would seek to oblige the  EU legislative bodies against 
their will to something. There is, however, no example apparent for such right. And because 
of the indicated intentions of the ECJ, it seems likely that this is not going to change 
significantly.
17 Though Article 37 ECFR, which formally has entered into force at the end of 
2009, does contain a commitment to environmental protection–as did the previous EU and EC 
Treaties–it is not designed as a fundamental right. 
Regarding  the  ECtHR,  the  situation  is  basically  similar,  although  somewhat 
differentiated in some aspects. Like the German Federal Constitutional Court, the ECtHR has 
in  fact  recognized  obligations  of  the  states  to  undertake  protective  actions  in  non-
environmental  cases  based  on  fundamental  rights,  though  not  often.
18  Furthermore,  the 
ECtHR has already granted information rights concerning environmental damages
19–though 
confusingly not based on the right to life and health, but on the right to privacy under Article 
8 ECHR
20. However, all environmental cases of the ECHR are ultimately limited to ensuring 
that in the course of administrative decisions, the concerns of individuals are adequately 
considered and, for example, the facts are raised carefully. This was expressed most recently 
                                                           
16 Cf. e.g. ECJ, OJ 2003, I-5659; 2004, I-9609; 1991, 4007; 1994, 955. In contrast, the ECtHR does not seem to 
pursue any theory of the functions of fundamental rights (in the sense of distinguishing between a defense and a 
protection function). However it apparently recognizes “protection” positions though their scope has not yet been 
spelled out, cf. e.g.ECtHR of 08.07.2004, 53924/ 00, n. 78 and passim; ECtHR, EuGRZ 1995, 530 (533). 
17 Of course, there are cases, though they are not numerous, in which the ECJ has declared EU legal acts void for 
formal reasons, e.g. due to a lack of legislative competence. But there does not appear to be any case in which 
the ECJ has ever required the EU to enact legal provisions against their will. 
18 For details, cf. Ekardt/ Susnjar, ZG 2007, 134 ff. 
19 Cf. e.g. EGMR, Urt. v. 21.01.2009, III. Kammer Bsw. Nr. 67.021/01. 
20 Consequently, the debate about EU environmental fundamental rights is currently focused on this provision, 
cf. e.g. Jarass, EU-Grundrechte, 2005, § 34 n. 1 ff.; Uerpmann-Wittzack, in: Ehlers (Ed.), Europäische 
Grundrechte und Grundfreiheiten, 3d Ed. 2009, § 3 n. 19.  
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in a case of mobile communications.
21 It appears that the obligation to adopt other, more 
effective laws on the basis of protection rights, which would trigger a reorientation of the 
whole society and would not just keep my privacy somehow “free from pollutants and noise,” 
has not been a subject of an affirmative ECHR judgments, so far. Nevertheless, taking into 
account this background, it can be stated that if any, the ECHR could be open to recognizing 
protection rights with respect to climate change. 
In any case, the mere factual existence of case law does not per se mean that it is right. 
And it does not simply apply because judgments only decide a specific case, but do not 
determine an abstract and general norm
22.
23 Thus, in the following we will test and analyze a 
somewhat altered interpretation  of existing law (based on judicial interpretation, i.e. by 
interpreting fundamental rights, not on policy considerations à la “suggesting a legislative 
change of the catalog of fundamental rights”). But what could  an intergenerationally and 
globally extended, i.e. better complying with the requirements of sustainability, interpretation 
of  freedom  and  fundamental  rights  look  like  to  be  more  precise  than  the  rather  vague 
discussion  of  an  environmental  fundamental  right?
24  In  deviation  from  the  probably 
prevailing view in Germany, on closer examination we can notice that the wording and the 
systematic  position  of  the  fundamental  concept  of  freedom,  which  is  implied  in  the 
fundamental rights, in the German Basic Law and in the ECFR –as well as ultimately also in 
the  ECHR–suggest  a  more  complex  interpretation  than  previously,  which  has  important 
                                                           
21 Cf. ECtHR, NVwZ 2008, 1215 ff. 
22 Even in the exceptional case where the written law rules differently–cf. Sec. 31 para. 2 German Federal 
Constitutional Court Act (BVerfGG) – the resulting general norm’s only content is that a legislative act in its 
specific formulation is declared void (here based on an action for an abstract legal review (abstrakte 
Normenkontrolle). Thus, once again, the final judgment concerns only a specific constellation (although this can 
be done “wrong,” too, in a liberal-democratic system, normally such a decision should nonetheless be 
recognized, since the alternative is even less desirable in terms of freedom: for it would ultimately be some kind 
of anarchy). However, it is by no means prescribed abstractly and generally, e.g. in the context of Sec. 31 para 2 
BVerfGG, that there was no need in every court proceeding and in every application of the law to search again 
for the “right” interpretation of the law. 
23 Laws, regulations, constitutions, etc. remain the only abstract and general norms. Nevertheless it is acceptable 
that the practice often turns to existing judgments, because (and only) in the event that no substantial grounds be 
argued in favor of a change of legal opinion, the burden of argumentation bears on the party challenging the 
existing legal opinion from previous case law (inter alia for reasons of legal certainty), cf. Alexy, Theorie der 
juristischen Argumentation, 2d Ed. 1991; on the rationality of the application of the law and the methods of legal 
interpretation, see Ekardt/ Beckmann, Verwaltungsarchiv 2008, 241 (244 ff.). 
24 We could often extend the following arguments by previously establishing that freedom or the underlying 
principles of human dignity and impartiality are the universal - and sole – basis of a just basic order. For reasons 
of space, this is omitted here. On details, cf. Ekardt, Theorie, §§ 3-6; similar in his basic orientation Alexy, 
Recht, Vernunft, Diskurs, 1995, 127 ff.; partly also Habermas, Faktizität und Geltung, 1992, 109 ff.; Ekardt 
a.a.O. also on the differences particularly to Habermas and Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 1971. as well as on the 
fact that only those constitutional theories show why a constitution like the German Grundgesetz is right–and 
what the meaning of its fundamental concept (human dignity), from which other findings can be derived, is (of 
course, regarding the meaning of dignity, there is other often overlooked constitutional evidence; see below in 
detail).  
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implications  in  the  climate  context.
25  Therefore, the resulting findings can ultimately be 
applied to any national or transnational human rights protection–also–against climate change. 
 
2.  Intergenerational  and  global  scope  of  fundamental  rights,  protecting  the  conditions  of 
freedom, and multipolarity of freedom 
The starting point for our considerations is the idea of liberties as classical-liberal guarantees 
of self-development. So far there is no need to criticize the prevailing view.  In addition, 
freedom also has an intergenerational
26 and global
27 dimension.
28 Why? In a nutshell
29: At 
their point in life, young and future people are of course people and therefore are protected by 
human rights–today this already applies to people in other countries. And the right to equal 
freedom must be directed precisely in that direction where it is threatened–in a technological, 
globalized world freedom is increasingly threatened across generations and across national 
borders.  Therefore  it  is  clear  that  fundamental  rights  also  apply  intergenerationally  and 
globally, i.e. in favor of the likely main victims of climate change–even though this issue has 
never been addressed in case law so far. 
The classical-liberal understanding of freedom, which is mainly focused on the economic 
freedom  of  those  living  here  and  now,  must  be  supplemented  in  other  points,  too.  E.g. 
liberties must be interpreted unambiguously in a way as to include the elementary physical 
freedom conditions–thus not only a right to social welfare, as it was recently acknowledged 
by the German Federal Constitutional Court
30, but also to the existence of a relatively stable 
resource base and a corresponding global climate. For without s uch a subsistence level and 
without life and health, there is no freedom.
31  This fundamental right to the elementary 
conditions of freedom is explicitly provided to the extent life and health are concerned (see 
                                                           
25 The issue here is thus an interpretation of all fundamental rights. The rights of equality which do not seem to 
fit are ultimately special protections of equal freedom and thus do not contradict the following considerations. 
26 With a partly similar reasoning, cf. also Unnerstall, Rechte, 422 ff.; Similar in his basic tendency but without 
more detailed reasons, cf. e.g. Kloepfer, in: Gethmann/ Kloepfer/ Nutzinger (Ed.), Langzeitverantwortung im 
Umweltstaat, 1993, 22 (26 ff.); Murswiek, Die staatliche Verantwortung für die Risiken der Technik, 1985, 212; 
with more details, cf. Ekardt, Theorie, §§ 4, 5; the arguments are apparently ignored by Eifert, Kritische Justiz 
2009, Beiheft 1, 211 (214) (thus falsely stating a weakness of reasoning. 
27 In this direction also Giegerich, EuGRZ 2004, 758 f. 
28 To be precise, fundamental rights of future people are not current rights, but their nature is that of “pre-effects” 
of future rights. This, however does not or not significantly alter their relevance; see in details Unnerstall, 
Rechte, 52 ff.; cf. also Ekardt, Das Prinzip Nachhaltigkeit, 2005, Chap. III. 
29 In more details on the three main arguments, cf. Ekardt, Theorie, § 4; partly cf. also Unnerstall, Rechte, 422 ff. 
30 Cf. BVerfG, Urt. v. 09.02.2010, 
http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/ls20100209_1bvl000109.html?Suchbegriff=Hartz+IV 
31 The international trend toward “social” fundamental rights to the various facets of the minimum subsistence 
thus has a theoretical justification. Such a “constitution of international law” can be derived from the legal 
source of the “general principles of law” (cf. Article 38 of the ICJ-Statute) without recourse to, e.g., the 
International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights; cf. Ekardt/ Meyer-Mews/ Schmeichel/ 
Steffenhagen, Welthandelsrecht und Sozialstaatlichkeit – Globalisierung und soziale Ungleichheit, Böckler-
Arbeitspapier No. 170, 2009, 42 ff.  
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Articles 2 paragraph 2 GG; 2, 3 ECFR; 2, 8 ECHR). In all other cases it must be based on the 
interpretation of the general right to freedom. Contrary to the prevailing view I argue that the 
German Article 2 paragraph 1 GG has a counterpart in Article 6 ECFR as a general EU right 
to freedom (using a interpretation in accordance with its wording. The same is true for Article 
5 ECHR and other similarly structured bills of rights. At least parts of a general right to 
freedom are also indisputably included in the right to privacy under Article 8 ECHR.–Based 
on  what  has  been  said  so  far,  this  right  to  life,  health  and  subsistence  also  applies 
intergenerationally and globally and is the subject of human rights protection against climate 
change. 
“Protection of freedom where it is endangered” also means that freedom also includes a 
right  to  protection  (by  the  state)  against  fellow  citizens  (and  not  only  in  exceptional 
circumstances). This is a protection for example against environmental destruction which is 
threatening my freedom and its conditions, such as climate change, by the state against my 
fellow citizens. Without that point there would be no human rights protection against climate 
change since states are not the primary emitters of greenhouse gases. The problem rather lies 
in the fact that states tolerate or approve greenhouse gas emissions by private actors. This 
particular idea need be explained in detail since it is not commonly articulated, as has been 
indicated above. But if fundamental rights equally included a protection of freedom against 
the state, but also by the state against fellow citizens and, therefore, conflicts of interest of any 
kind  must  regularly  be  understood  as  multipolar  (not  bipolar)  conflicts  of  freedoms 
(multipolarity), then this would rebut 
a) the  traditional,  more  objective,  status  of  fundamental  rights  protection  (protection 
obligations instead of protection rights, thus non-actionable duties!) 
b) the traditional imbalance between defensive and protective side of fundamental rights, 
i.e.  the  regular  elimination  of  protection  obligations,  unless  there  is  a  case  of  “evident 
insufficiency”  (understood  as  something  which  realistically  never  occurs,  namely  the 
complete absence of regulation in an area of law). This includes the idea that an effect on 
third  parties  might  be  a  mere  “reflex”  which  was  not  even  covered  by  the  scope  of 
fundamental rights). 
c) Multi-polarity would equally refute the assumption, which builds on the view in a) and 
b),  that  the  protective  side  of  the  fundamental  rights  is  almost  entirely  taken  up  with 
administrative norms, which are supposedly subject to wide legislative discretion, and is not 
of significant importance either with regard to standing in administrative cases nor regarding 
the  application  of  substantive  law  (“Primacy  of  the  (simple)  law”  is  a  rather  modest  
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description of these far-reaching conclusions
32). This aspect refers to the fact that, so far, 
commonly, particularly in Germany, protection rights are not considered a yardstick for 
individual activity with relevance to the climate, such as the approval of a coal power plant or 
a lignite open-cast mine. 
What are the arguments for multipolarity and how can we respond to certain well-known 
counter-arguments? In the following I will discuss whether protection rights exist regarding 
only the scope of fundamental rights (which would trigger standing in administra tive and 
constitutional law cases). The details of necessary balancing (which will e.g. determine how 
much weight fundamental rights will have when interpreting substantive administrative law, 
e.g. discretion, in light of those rights) will be analyzed lat er on. This clear distinction 
between scope of fundamental rights and balancing differs significantly from case law which 
rarely clarifies whether its skepticism about protection (fundamental) rights refers to issues of 
standing, scope or restrictions of f undamental rights (this remains unclear even in the –
ephemeral–recourse to protection (fundamental) rights in cases of administrative law). 
First, the multipolarity of fundamental rights follows from the very idea of freedom, 
which is the center of liberal-democratic constitutions–and, as indicated in a footnote, as a 
philosophical necessity. Fundamental rights as elementary rights are intended to give firm 
protection  against  typical  hazards  for  freedom.  For  hereby  they  realize  the  necessary 
autonomy of the individual which is embodied in the principle of dignity. This autonomy is 
not only threatened directly by the state, but also by private actors, whose actions are “only” 
approved or tolerated by the state. To dispute this statement, one would have to argue, e.g., 
that the construction of an industrial plant is relevant to the freedom of the operator but not to 
the residents’ freedom. The classical-liberal thinking, in fact, tends to such an assumption. 
This view has also been adopted by the current case law. But the very purpose of a liberal 
state is to allow a balance of conflicts as impartial as possible, i.e. independent of special 
perspectives, and not to prefer a specific (e.g. more economically oriented) life plan. All this 
shows that protection rights do exist, that defense and protection are equally important–and 
that we should speak of protection rights, not obligations, since otherwise the equality would 
just not be recognized.
33 
Second,  the  multipolarity  of  fundamental  rights  appears  in  limitation  or  balancing 
                                                           
32 A pure “primacy in application” would be perfectly acceptable if the fundamental right was balanced 
correctly, and this balance was “codified” as a “simple law.” But this assessment, whether the fundamental right 
was indeed correctly implemented into the law, shall not be omitted if fundamental rights do apply generally, cf. 
Ekardt/ Schmeichel, Zeitschrift für europarechtliche Studien 2009, 171 (176 ff.) (analyzing the issue of “final 
harmonization of a legal domain by EU secondary law.”). 
33 Incidentally, “protection” as defined in this argument can also consist in granting a benefit to an individual, 
such as a monetary payment to secure a minimum level of subsistence.  
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provisions such as Article 2 paragraph 1 GG or Article 52 ECFR
34 which are also presumed at 
several instances in the ECHR: As paradigmatic defining principles of liberal-democratic bills 
of rights these norms also, more practically, prescribe that the freedom of action is limited by 
“the rights and freedoms of others.” The European “constitution” (here) in the form of the 
ECFR and the ECHR as well as the German Basic Law thus assumes that if the state resolves 
specific conflicts, not only different interests but explicitly different fundamental rights clash. 
The third argument is the wording of provisions such as Article 1 paragraph 1 sentence 2 
GG or Article 1 ECFR which have been briefly referred to above. Public authorities shall 
“respect” and “protect” human dignity and also the liberties, which under Article 1 paragraph 
2 GG (“therefore”) exist for dignity’s sake, and thus must be interpreted according to its 
structure.  This  relation  (“therefore”)  can  also  be  found  in  the  materials  of  the  ECFR.  In 
addition, the double dimension (“respect / protection”) of human dignity and therefore also of 
the fundamental rights–given the function of dignity as a reason for all human rights
35 which 
was just described–shows that freedom can be impaired by threats from various sides and 
that, therefore, it implies defense and protection. But most of all, the word “protect” would 
lose its linguistic sense if it only meant that the state shall not exercise direct coercion against 
the  citizens  (otherwise  the  state  could  simply  retreat  to  not  acting  at  all  instead  of 
“protecting”). Hence norms such as Article 1 paragraph 1 GG and Article 1 ECFR also imply 
a protection against fellow citizens. And defense and protection are linguistically on equal 
footing  there.  All  this  implies  again  that  there  are  fundamental  rights  of  defense  and 
protection and that protection and defensive rights must be equally strong–and that we should 
speak of protection rights,  not  of somewhat  less  strong mere protection obligations.  This 
holds true even though (in the interests of an institutional system based on democracy and a 
separation  of  powers,  which  is  indeed  the  most  effective  protection  of  freedom)  this 
“protection” cannot be understood as a direct effect of fundamental rights among citizens, but 
as a claim against the state for protection (see, specifically Article 1 paragraph 3 GG and 
Article 51 ECFR). 
In  Germany,  many  would  respond  that  the  protective  function  of  fundamental  rights 
could only be an objective function which cannot individually be claimed and without any 
real equality, since it was based on the doctrine of fundamental rights as an (also) objective 
order  of  values  (Wertordnungslehre)  as  it  was  developed  by  the  German  Federal 
                                                           
34 On details of the latter provision, see Ekardt/ Kornack, ZEuS 2010, 111. 
35 Article 1 paragraph 2 GG as well as the title of this section-and also the materials on the ECFR-talk about 
“human rights.” Thus not only “some” rights are based on dignity, as one might respond, but all of them. 
Therefore, the structure of human rights, i.e., “equal respect and protection” applies to all and not just some 
human rights.  
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Constitutional Court. But this argument is unconvincing. First, it does not refute any of the 
arguments given above. Second, the Constitutional Court’s doctrine of the order of values is 
diffuse  regarding  its  content  and  ultimately  untenable–thus  it  cannot  justify  a  (different) 
understanding  of  protection.  The  order  of  values  doctrine  is  not  itself  a  justification  for 
anything, but merely an assertion that fundamental rights are not only defensive rights, but 
also have other, though limited in their strength, functions. Therefore, this doctrine is a mere 
claim which needs to be proved first to be convincing. The Federal Constitutional Court has 
never given any reasons for its order of values doctrine–beyond a rather vague reference to an 
“overall picture” of fundamental rights and national objectives.
36 The idea of fundamental 
rights as a mere “objective order” also contradicts the individualistic nature of fundamental 
rights. How could it be justified that some fundamental rights are not of a subjective nature 
and thus are not enforceable–especially after considering the arguments given above? 
Certainly  unconvincing  is  the  complete  negation  of  the  protective  function  of 
fundamental rights as more or less clearly insinuated by representatives of the Böckenförde 
school of thought
37. That position seems to be  based on the non-realizable hope of finding 
“certain” results  through an interpretation  which is  limited to  pure defense aspects  (“less 
conflicts of standards = less balancing”). But there will never be such certainty. This is not 
only true because of the terminology of basic orders which consists of unclear terms such as 
freedom or dignity. Via the instrument of constitutional interpretation those terms infect the 
entire determination of the law. It is also true because of the general semantic frictions of 
interpreting norms (especially of the teleological interpretation) and because of the general 
normative  character  of  legal  standards,  which  excludes  the  possibility  of  a  “fact-analog 
observing” of the right norms/ interpretations of norms/ judgments.
38 The decisive factor is 
rather the nature of the test for limitations of fundamental rights which must inevitably be 
undertaken in any case of an interference with fundamental rights and which leads, in one 
way or another, to balancing of the conflicting interests.
39 Most importantly, the sole focus on 
                                                           
36 Cf. German Federal Constitutional Court, Vol. 4 (BVerfGE 4, 7 ff.; 7, 198 (205)). 
37 Cf. e.g. Böckenförde, Der Staat 1990, 1 (24 f. and 29 f.); Böckenförde, Recht, Staat, Freiheit, 1991, 67 ff.; 
Enders, in: Friauf/ Höfling (Ed.), GG, Kommentar, leaflet, before Art. 1 n. 135 ff.; into the same direction also 
Schlink, Abwägung im Recht, 1981. 
38 Cf. Somek/ Forgo, Nachpositivistisches Rechtsdenken, 1996, 81 ff.; Jeand'Heur, Sprachliches 
Referenzverhalten bei der juristischen Entscheidungstätigkeit, 1989, 11 and passim; Alexy, Theorie, 17 ff.; 
Ekardt/ Beckmann, Verwaltungsarchiv 2008, 241 ff. “Normative character” does certainly not mean “subjective” 
as was shown by the basic philosophical argument just given in the text. – Note that the concept of objectivity / 
subjectivity in terms of knowledge is not linked at all to the distinction between subjective rights and objective 
rights (which no one individually has standing to claim). 
39 This is true even if these conflicting interests are understood as mere objective legal principles and not as 
subjective rights. A fortiori it would apply if the protective function of fundamental rights was covered by a wide 
notion of defensive rights against indirect interferences with fundamental rights.  
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defensive rights misconceives the multipolarity of freedom and the respective arguments put 
forward. And it ignores that the dogmatic tradition on which it is based relies on anachronistic 
variations  of  constitutionalism  and  liberalism  as  well  as,  ultimately,  on  pre-democratic 
German ideas and is thus quite a dubious guide to the interpretation of modern basic orders. 
Furthermore,  one  could  not  argue  that  the  recognition  of  protection  rights  prescribed  the 
citizens a particular form of the good life (or that they were required to make use of their 
freedom). 
The preceding tried to show (I) that, and why, there must be protection rights as aspects 
of fundamental rights and (II) that they are subjective, individual rights. And not only this: 
The arguments–especially that defense and protection are mentioned side by side – also point 
out that (III) defense must be on an equal footing with protection.
40 Another argument in 
favor of the second and the third aspect is the lo ng-standing criticism of and doubt about the 
distinctness of the two functions of fundamental rights that the German case law generally 
assumes  (and  in  this  explicitness  probably  only  German  case  law)
41.  Specifically  the 
delineation between defensive rights against indirect interferences – which apply to someone 
who ultimately seeks protection by the state against other citizens, like protection rights–and 
protection rights does not seem to be reasonably determinable.
42 Superficially, the subject of 
the defensive right against indirect interventions is the exercise of influence by the public 
authorities on a citizen who in turn limits the rights of another citizen. Such a right is granted 
by the courts in slightly contoured but only sporadic cases (consequently, at least parts of the 
Böckenförde school of thought seem to be skeptical about this approach). In the case of 
protection rights, in contrast, the subject seemingly is a lack of or insufficiently effective 
prevention of private acts by the state. But how  should one precisely be distinguished from 
another? For instance, instead of assuming protection rights in situations of indirect defensive 
rights one can always ask why permitting, not preventing, or participating in private acts 
which interfere with others’ freedom should not trigger defensive rights against an indirect 
                                                           
40 In favor of an equal footing cf. already (but without comprehensive reasoning) Schwabe, Juristenzeitung 2007, 
134 ff.; Calliess, Rechtsstaat und Umweltstaat, 2001; Koch, Der Grundrechtsschutz des Drittbetroffenen, 2000, 
S. 503; Vosgerau, Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts 2008, 346 ff.; cf. also Murswiek, Verantwortung, 101 ff. 
(intending a synchronization of environmental use and environmental protection though not by expanding the 
protective aspect of fundamental rights but restricting their defense aspect (when determining the scope of 
fundamental rights). 
41 The following objections are not refuted by the attempts of clarification in Dietlein, Die Lehre von den 
grundrechtlichen Schutzpflichten, 1992, 87 ff.; Gellermann, Grundrechte in einfachgesetzlichem Gewande, 
2000, 452 and passim; Steinberg, Verfassungsstaat, 71 ff., 307 ff.; the same holds true for Ladeur, Die 
öffentliche Verwaltung 2007, 1 ff. 
42 Cf. also Dietlein, Lehre, 89 f.: „Die von der Rechtsprechung entwickelten Lösungsansätze muten zufällig und 
ergebnisorientiert an“ – (recalling e.g. BVerfG, Vol. 39 (BVerfGE 39, 1 (42)); Vol. 55, 349 (363); Vol. 56, 54 
(61); German Federal Court of Justice, Vol. 64 (BGHZ 64, 220 (222))).  
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interference with fundamental rights (especially as, e.g., an environmental or building permit 
imposes obligations to tolerate on third parties). Even case law does not offer useful criteria 
for differentiation. Many might respond: Under defensive rights a citizen can only demand 
that the state does not undertake one clearly defined action (e.g. “not adopt a demolition order 
for my house”). In contrast, protection rights could only trigger a general duty to act (e.g. 
“more protection against sulfur dioxide from facility X”), the fulfillment of which must give 
leeway to the public authorities. But this is not true per se, as an example shows. Not only the 
addressee of a demolition order (direct interference) may say: “I want to get rid of exactly this 
order.” Just as well a neighbor who is affected by a permit may say: “Down with the permit!” 
Each situations concern a particular action–in the latter case, regardless of whether you call 
this  the  defense  of  an  indirect  interference  or  a  request  for  protection
43. Defense against 
indirect interventions and protection are thus not reasonably distinguishable. Ultimately the 
case law probably only uses this distinction as a false justification, in order to allow one third 
party claim but disallow another. Such third party claims will primarily be allowed if there are 
economic concerns (as in the cases of public warnings). 
This indistinguishability is a further argument in favor of our thesis that the c lassical-
liberal economic freedom cannot precede “environmental fundamental rights” and thus cannot 
be  argued  against  a  human  rights  protection  against  climate  change.  At  least  the 
indistinguishability  is  an  argument  against  the  courts’  camouflaging  differentiation  of 
defensive rights  against indirect  interference and protection obligations  in  order to  affirm 
fundamental rights in one case and largely deny them in other another (while often speaking 
about a “mere legal reflex” which means nothing at all: Why should it not be relevant for a 
fundamental right, if an interference with its scope of freedom is caused by a state decision?). 
All this is not altered by the tendency in the practice of (especially German) courts to deny 
claims  of  (even  fundamental)  rights  if  some  kind  of  “public”  is  concerned,  which  is 
necessarily the case with respect to climate change. For whether a right is impaired, does not 
depend on whether others are also affected. 
 
3. Environmental fundamental rights, democracy, separation of powers–Objections against 
real protection rights as misunderstandings about balancing under constitutional law 
Of course, a human rights protection against climate change or a multipolar conception of 
freedom  respectively  is  potentially  exposed  to  a  group  of  other  objections,  which  are  all 
related and can therefore only reasonably be treated as a whole. The gist of these objections 
                                                           
43 Incidentally, the possibility of indirect horizontal effects of fundamental rights is not called into question by 
the foregoing and the following, but rather affirmed, cf. Ekardt, Information, § 1 C. I.  
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is: Protection rights overthrew democratic parliaments, and in “protection” cases there was 
per se larger leeway than in “defensive” cases.
44 While addressing these, I will also explain 
why this criticism includes several incorrect assumptions–but why are there are nonetheless 
margins under the doctrine of balancing between competing spheres of freedom which need 
be filled in a democratic procedure. At the same time, this will outline a theory of balancing 
of (in this case: environmental) fundamental rights, which has also an influence on the non-
constitutional law of the respective jurisdiction, in a way which will be analyzed later. Only 
by looking at the balancing level it becomes clear what concrete obligations of the nation 
states and the EU arise from human rights in terms of climate policy. 
There  are two relevant  issues.  On the one hand, it will be shown that human rights 
protection against climate change cannot disappear in vast political latitude, as it is currently 
commonly accepted. On the other hand, however, human rights protection against climate 
change may not avoid the question of balancing and, therefore, may not give the impression 
that there was no balancing issue as it is sometimes the case in the transnational discussion 
about  environment  fundamental  rights.  For  in  this  debate  often  emerges  the  idea  that 
interferences with fundamental rights were generally justified even without a detailed test of 
balancing procedures (this can be found in many judgments of the ECJ and the ECHR
45)–or 
the debate is reversed as if any interference with a fundamental right were also a violation of 
this right, but without any reference to case law and usually without any concrete conclusions, 
but rather at the level of sonorous proclamations.
46 
So, do protection rights–and accordingly human rights against climate change–damage 
democracy? This raises the old question of the relationship between freedom and democracy. 
Not only some lawyers, but also some philosophers think (partly implicitly) that democracy 
even  has  latent  priority  over  freedom.  It  is  initially  correct  that  freedom  and  democracy 
contribute to each other–as is argued for example by Jürgen Habermas.
47 A democracy which 
                                                           
44 On further objections (alleged threat of “a wave of suits” and “snooping” among citizens) cf. Ekardt, 
Information, § 5 A.-B. 
45 On the necessary further development of a European legal test for a violation of fundamental rights and 
fundamental freedoms see in more detail Ekardt/ Schmeichel, Zeitschrift für europarechtliche Studien 2009, 171 
(197 ff.). On the relation of the “three constitutional courts” from a new perspective, cf. Ekardt/ Lessmann, 
Kritische Justiz 2006, 381 ff. 
46 These two extreme variations also dominate in the context of the debate on “WTO and Human Rights.” On 
that debate (with an own approach) see Ekardt/ Meyer-Mews/ Schmeichel/ Steffenhagen, Welthandelsrecht, 42 
ff. 
47 In the Kantian respectively liberal democratic theory of justice, freedom and democracy both follow from the 
principles of human dignity and impartiality (the latter principle is also sometimes called principle of 
universalizability or categorical imperative, with a slightly different meaning). These principles are in turn 
understood as required by rationality or reason respectively. Die Überhöhung des Demokratieprinzips bei 
Habermas, Faktizität, S. 109 ff. und 537 ergibt sich teilweise daraus, dass er anders als Kant oder Rawls das 
Menschenwürde- bzw. Autonomieprinzip nicht aus der Rationalität folgen lässt, sondern als dogmatisch gesetzt  
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is  based  on  certain  principles,  e.g.,  a  separation  of  powers,  however,  promises  greater 
freedom, rationality and impartiality than a “radical” Habermasian democracy, which reduces 
the  constitutional  jurisdiction  to  a  mere  control  of  procedures.  That  is  precisely  why 
constitutions just like the German Base Law are based on a separation of powers and are not 
structured as radical democracies. Particularly justice between generations and global justice 
(and thus  sustainability), i.e., the freedom  of  young people and those  living after us,  are 
arguments against radical democracy. Since for future and young people and those living 
geographically far away democracy is not an act of self-determination but of heteronomy. For 
today they are not participants in this democracy. Against this background, first the criticism 
on multipolarity is incorrect which assumes that a liberal-democratic constitution implied a 
kind of omnipotent parliament (which would exclude multipolar rights since they impose 
additional limitations on legislation and administration). This is not demanded, but rather a 
system of balance of powers in the interests of the best possible protection of freedom and of 
a maximum of rationality and impartiality.
48 The public authorities’ task is to protect these 
very principles. A separation of powers at the national and at the European level as well as the 
existence of strong constitutional courts underline that the respective parliament is in fact not 
supposed to be omnipotent. This then leads to a democracy which is not a principle opposing 
freedom,  but  a  principle  resolving  conflict  between  freedoms.  This  function  makes  it 
reasonable to have further conflict resolving institutions, e.g., courts. All this is particularly 
true if it can be shown that freedom may only be restricted to enhance freedom or freedom 
conditions–of which the elementary above that were proven just as in the climate context 
relevant, may be subjectivized, the other conditions which only support freedom (such as 
supporting the arts or kindergartens) is not.
49 
Up to this point we have seen several things, sometimes even before explicitly discussing 
the concept of democracy: Even without multipolarity democracy has its boundaries anyway. 
It  is  always  necessary  to  balance  conflicting  interests  anyway.  And  the  analysis  of  the 
functions  of  fundamental  rights  has  also  shown  that  necessary  defensive  and  protection 
constellations do not differ per se. Now, we have to make further considerations. In balancing 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
sieht. 
48 See the remark and the reference in footnote ... on the validity of the Kantian thesis: that universal rationality 
demands freedom (and a democracy with separated powers) on the basis of human dignity and impartiality. This 
thesis (including all that can possibly be derived from it, such as protection of freedom conditions and balancing 
rules) withstands any, particularly post-modern constructivist, criticism. This is the only thing that rationality 
demands in the fields of morals and law. 
49 Cf. in details the references in footnote ... In contrast, e.g., Alexy, Recht, 127 ff.–and certainly Habermas, 
Faktizität, 109 ff.–apparently do not limit the number of possible concerns which democratic politics can 
consider as relevant interests. My approach, on the other hand, excludes a protection of a person against herself 
or an invention of public authorities into areas of the good life–which should be in line with liberal democracies 
(a fact that is rarely stated or even justified clearly).  
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conflicting positions, a parliament has, in fact, a certain prerogative to the judiciary, albeit not 
an absolute one. Because whenever balancing of conflicting interests may lead to a number of 
different results–and this is the norm–a decision maker which is elected and can be deselected 
is the most rational and freedom supporting alternative: thus a parliament and not a court. The 
parliament, however, must remain within the limits set by the rules of balancing which can be 
deducted  from  the  very  fundamental  rights  (you  can  also  call  it  a  multipolar  test  of 
proportionality substantiated with further rules
50). We will get back to some of these rules in 
more detail. The problem with the existing German debate is that many people erroneously 
conclude that since there is usually not “precisely one” result of balancing  (optimally even 
identified by quantification and calculation in economic terms) there were no multi-polarity 
(i.e., not equality of defensive and protection rights) and no further rules of balancing beyond 
appropriateness/ necessity.
51 We shall see that this is not true. In any way, what has been said 
above  holds  true  equally  for  and  independently  of  the  political  or  legal  area  one  is 
considering. The decision on the right laws in regarding security and anti-terror policy (which 
unquestionably commonly has been held a question of fundamental rights) just does not 
follow different rules than climate change policy which is the subject of our analysis. The 
legislature may make different choices, and the   task of constitutional courts is (only) to 
control the framework of those decisions based on a set of balancing rules which are derived 
from the very liberties. The issue is always that some institution of control such as a 
constitutional court reviews the adherence to rules of balancing. Afterwards, the legislature 
may react by (partly) altering the constitution. Or the issue is that another institution of 
control such as a non-constitutional court assesses compliance with the legislative will by the 
administration or compliance with rules of balancing when such balancing has been passed on 
to the administration, etc. 
Working out the details of the rules of balancing, the balance of powers becomes even 
less focused on jurisdictions and judicial decisions t han previously  (where the German 
Federal Constitutional Court or the European Court of Justice may ultimately decide ad 
                                                           
50 Similar, see Calliess, Rechtsstaat, 373 ff.; Susnjar, Proportionality, Fundamental Rights, and Balance of 
Powers, 2010. 
51 Prominently, cf. Böckenförde, Staat, Verfassung, Demokratie, 1991, 188 ff. and passim. The position of the 
German Federal Constitutional Court is unclear. Sometimes it proceeds like the ECJ with respect to balancing 
(basically just testing for a legitimate purpose–very generously–, appropriateness, and necessity). But sometimes 
it operates on a (larger) volume of balancing rules as it was proposed in this essay. Finally, sometimes the 
BVerfG seems to dictate “precisely one” balancing results to the legislature (e.g., with respect to the protection 
of embryos). This is another consequence of the unclear protection theory of protection obligations; critical 
Steinberg, Neue juristische Wochenschrift 1996, 1995 ff.; Susnjar, Proportionality, passim. See specifically on 
the issue how in a few cases (though not from the principle of human dignity) total prohibitions of balancing 
may be inferred, e.g. Ekardt/ Kornack, Kritische Vierteljahreszeitschrift für Gesetzgebung und 
Rechtswissenschaft 2006, 349 ff.  
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libitum, whether parliaments shall have wide, limited or–as in the abortion decisions–“no” 
discretion). The aim must be a ping pong, which multipolarily supports freedom (one the one 
hand preventing abuses of power, on the other hand regarding democracy as a shield for 
freedom)  and is  also  adequate in  terms  of impartiality, with  a “multiple-level  discourse,” 
which in turn supports rationality since it mobilizes a maximum of good reasons, among the 
state powers. First, a constitutional court may never order a judgment against a parliament 
stating “You have to do precisely this.” Contrary, it must always limit its decisions to saying 
“At least you must not continue doing this.” For instance, the German Federal Constitutional 
Court  may  not  demand  from  the  German  Bundestag–to  use  a  key  example  of  climate 
protection: “Phase out the use of coal power within four and a half years.” It may say: “The 
previous phasing out is too slow; take a new decision on the issue until XX.YY.2010, taking 
into  account  the  following  fact  situations,  normative  concerns,  as  well  as  procedural  and 
balancing rules.” Conversely, the constitutional court could rule on an action brought by an 
energy company: “Of course, the legislature may phase out nuclear power generation–but it 
must remain within a certain limit which it has crossed unfortunately, as it has demanded 
phasing out the use of nuclear energy within three days.” Such a line that neither takes away 
the  prerogative  from  the  parliament  nor  gives  the  constitutional  court  excessive,  unclear 
power allows all state powers to function as good as possible regarding their respective tasks 
defined by freedom, democracy, impartiality, and rationality. This is all the more true as the 
ping pong also includes the administration and the lower courts, as just outlined by the brief 
introductory note on the “passing on” of balancing by the legislature. It allows authorities to 
respond to a court decision with new decisions, which then in turn are subject to judicial 
control. The same is true with respect to the legislator and the constitutional jurisdiction. And 
the legislature may also react on decisions of lower courts with legislative changes, etc. This 
creates a complex web of competences for concretization and control.
52 It follows from the 
stated principles that courts are limited in their review of issues of normative balancing, 
difficult interpretations of the factual requirements of norms, and uncertain questions of fact–
in contrast, their review is not restricted with respect to simple interpretations of the factual 
requirements of norms, issues of procedure, and certain facts.
53 
The coal example shows that in complex situations such as climate change the defensive 
                                                           
52 A basic, but frequently encountered misconception is, after all, to express that courts themselves had to 
undertake balancing (although the legislature only sporadically “passed on” such balancing to the courts, e.g., to 
the civil courts for the concretization of civil general clauses in light of conflicting rights–a constitutional court 
may then only review whether the civil court complied with the rules of balancing in its decision). This is not 
sufficiently clear, e.g., in Hofmann, Zeitschrift für Umweltrecht 2007, 470 (471 f.). 
53 Cf. in more detail, Ekardt, Information, § 5; Ekardt/ Schenderlein, Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 
2008, 1059 ff. (focusing on aspects of European law).  
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aspect of fundamental rights is by no means “clearer” than the supposedly more sophisticated 
protection aspect. For example, the legislature may allow for the “defensive” rights of utility 
companies in very different ways if it wants to phase out the use of coal (or nuclear energy). It 
may determine equitable compensation, grant transition periods, etc. And the same holds true 
for possible claims for protection–it can deactivate all nuclear power plants, otherwise build 
them safer, take stronger protection against terrorist attacks, etc. This complexity, however, is 
independent of the respective function of fundamental rights. And regarding both “defense” 
as well as “protection,” if these functions exist at all, it is clear: In a democracy based on the 
separation of powers, laws for more climate protection and sustainability need be made by 
parliament, not a court.
54 Nevertheless, considering the foregoing we can state that a human 
rights protection against climate change does exist in principle–and that it does make sense to 
imagine such judgments of constitutional courts. 
 
III. Climate protection as an issue of balancing conflicting fundamental rights 
1. Rules of balancing, precaution, and the problem of “absolute” minimum standards 
On this basis and in consideration of possible political balancing we can further develop the 
specific  obligations  that  eventually  bear  on  politics  regarding  climate  change.  Only  after 
determining what remains of the commitment to climate protection that was derived before, it 
becomes  clear  what  judicially  enforceable  obligations  politics  has  in  terms  of  climate 
change.
55 
As  already  mentioned,  with  respect  (also)  to  (environmental)  fundamental  rights 
balancing is inevitable, and in general  it is nothing sensational. To put it somewhat more 
plastic: Since politics allows an industrial society, industrial facilities, approve traffic permits, 
etc., it knowingly accepts statistical deaths, i.e. impairment of the right to the elementary 
conditions of freedom as a result of emissions of air pollutants, etc. This is done balancing 
those interests with our freedom to consume and the economic freedom of the consumers. 
Usually the camouflaging term stochastic damage is used in this context. It means st atistical 
                                                           
54 Therefore, judgments like those of the German Federal Constitutional Court regarding protection of embryos 
or family taxation are problematic; cf. in particular BVerfG, Vol. 39 (BVerfGE 39, 1 ff.; 88, 203 ff.) Thus, 
perhaps a constitutional court should never repeal laws, as the House of Lords in Britain does (including the use 
of demand for reconsideration instead of cassations in so-called defense cases). At least it should be true to 
regard the repeal of a law as an exceptional case which requires further reasons–and otherwise order the 
parliament to alter a law instead of repealing it or dictating the wording of the alteration. 
55 The fact that theories of economic efficiency are no good alternatives to the following theory of balancing is 
outlined in Ekardt, in: Pan Jiahua, Climate Change (forthcoming). However, this does not rule out the 
quantification of facts by the legislature within (!) the rules of balancing. Within those rules(!) the legislature 
may also use its discretion to weigh interests subjectively within the objective limit by demonstrating that it has 
assigned a numerical value to normative concerns. This, in turn, is a subjective decision which is not objective at 
all.  
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cases of illnesses and deaths that occur at least long term and in combination with other 
causes of damage in the wake of the way of life in the industrial society. Since there is indeed 
no general formula “harm no one” (neminem laedere
56) (because otherwise almost everything 
else  would  be  prohibited,  for  numerous  human  actions  are  in  some  way  unfortunate  for 
anyone) this in itself is just not scandalous. The very absurdity rather lies in schizophrenia 
such as “we want more climate protection and yet continuous economic growth,” i.e. it lies in 
political compromise formula, which in fact deny the necessity of painful balancing.
57 
What rules of balancing have to be applied in particular situations may be derived from 
the core of liberty rights. This is shown first for the basic rule of balancing, which under the 
usual terminology of balancing as a proportionality test is often referred to as “legitimate 
purpose”: that, on the one hand, the material for balancing must be complete and, on the other 
hand, must not contain impermissible concerns. Further reasons have been given elsewhere 
for the assumption that self-determination or the new interpretation of freedom, respectively–
and everything that follows from it–is the only justifiable criterion of justice and the only 
possible subject matter of state action. If this is true, then it is also relatively easy to specify as 
a balancing rule, what the (only) permissible material of just balancing is: the very freedom of 
all people concerned which, as shown, includes the essential freedom conditions. In addition 
to these human rights such other concerns are permissible subject matters of balancing that 
support freedom but are no absolutely necessary requirements and, since they are not logically 
included in the concept of freedom, are no human rights (e.g. supporting the arts or creating 
spots at kindergartens).
58 In addition to the sole justifiability of the principle of freedom the 
foregoing is confirmed by another consideration: it is also the only way to clar ify that both 
authoritarian restrictions of freedom as well as an economically liberal-postmodern ignorance 
of freedom conditions are inadmissible. Thus, interventions on issues which do not affect the 
freedom of several people–i.e. regarding the good life instead–are excluded.
59 Likewise not 
                                                           
56 This is ignored in, e.g., Hochhuth, Relativitätstheorie des öffentlichen Rechts, 2000. 
57 Overall, the literature rarely developed balancing rules involving protection rights. But see Calliess, 
Rechtsstaat, 373 ff. and Cremer, Die öffentliche Verwaltung 2008, 102 ff.–On the fact that sustainability in a 
physically finite world  (despite the potential of, e.g., solar energy) is incompatible with continuous economic 
growth, cf. Daly, Growth, passim; Ekardt, Cool Down, Chap. 1; Wuppertal-Institut, Deutschland, passim. 
58 Even if the reference to freedom is seldom made in this context, yet it may be common ground that those 
conditions that “merely support freedom” are at least no human rights–there is a fundamental right to 
subsistence, but no fundamental right to a spot at a kindergarten. Despite its new grounds and new terminology 
this statement is in line with the common German debate on the welfare principle (Article 20 paragraph 1 GG): 
The idea of “subsistence” is necessarily limited, be it in social or environmental terms. However, (in Germany 
and the EU) the freedom conditions of living and health are already explicitly labeled as fundamental rights. The 
discussion whether a marginal area of health “is essential and therefore covered by the scope of fundamental 
rights” would thus be of little practical relevance. 
59 In more detail on a partially similar theory of balancing rules (but with different standards and a justification 
of those standards which is rather based on the rule of law than liberties, which makes their derivation more  
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consistent is today's practice, generally to declare “the common good” (or a “public interest”) 
a permissible concern for balancing. For the term common good is meaningless and thus 
ultimately arbitrary. From the point of view of legal theory it is consequently unnecessary and 
potentially authoritarian.
60 Moreover, “the common good” does not reveal the main issue: 
everyone’s self-determination. Against this background the notion of “the common good” 
should  be  removed  from  legal  arguments  and,  as  far  as  it  explicitly  appears  in  laws,  be 
interpreted  as  the  protection  of  freedom  and  freedom  conditions.  The  most  part  of  what 
conventionally is called “common good,” can be called freedom condition, anyway (such as 
support of the arts, the non-essential part of social justice, protection of biodiversity, etc.)–the 
only difference is that the new concept offers clearer contours and a real justification of those 
concerns. This is how the notion of “the common good” could possibly be attributed in part to 
its original meaning: interests that deserve consideration in a just state. But that would need 
more accurate reconsideration and assessment–not a mere proclamation of the formula of the 
common good–which may also disguise the lack of real reasons (and is thus detrimental to the 
rationality and impartiality of public decisions). European and German law still lacks such a 
clear definition, of course without any justification.
61 In essence, human rights protection 
against climate change  deals with a collision of the fundamental rights to the elementary 
conditions  of  freedom  with  economic  liberties,  as  for  example  governed  by  Article  2, 
paragraph 1, Article 12, paragraph 1, and Article 14, paragraph 1 GG. Of course, economic 
freedom is a recognized concern of national, European, and international fundamental rights. 
Protection rights in the environmental context are not excluded from the permissible 
material for balancing despite the fact that climate change and (most) other environmental 
cases concern only hazards of fundamental rights. By the same token, the scope of protection 
rights is indeed affected by such hazards. Undoubtedly, future trends of climate change are 
not per se exactly predictable and therefore “uncertain.” However, such an objection would 
fail, because impairments of fundamental rights which are “only possible” are not irrelevant at 
least  with  respect  to  particularly  important  fundamental  rights  and  under  the  threat  of 
irreversibility  of  the  “possible”  infringement.  This  is  true  even  though  German  case  law 
seems to implicitly presuppose such irrelevance by considering precaution (i.e., “risks” or 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
difficult and consequently decreases the gain in clarity of balancing rules), cf. Susnjar, Proportionality, Chap. 5. 
60 On this issue and the following, see with further references Ekardt, Information, § 1 E. (also on the 
authoritarian or even totalitarian legal history oft he term); on the other hand, for attempts to keep the notion as a 
(non substantive) formula for necessary balancing and procedure, cf. Häberle, Öffentliches Interesse als 
juristisches Problem, 1970; Uerpmann, Das öffentliche Interesse, 1999. 
61 Cf. Grabenwarter, EMRK, 4th ed. 2009, § 18 n. 12 f.  
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“uncertain  impairments”)  mostly  non-actionable–in  contrast  to  European  case  law.
62 
Otherwise, fundamental rights would no longer  serve the very purpose of legal fundamental 
rights: to guarantee the protection of autonomy exactly where autonomy is threatened with 
impairment.  And  such  impairment  does  not  primarily  come  from  public  authorities. 
Furthermore, risk and precaution are not reasonably distinguishable, as is proved elsewhere.
63 
It should also be recalled that the recent climate change projections could not only be “too 
pessimistic,” but rather, as elsewhere stated, that there are indications that the climate change 
predictions so far have even been too optimistic–and that therefore looming human rights 
impairments caused by climate change might be more dramatic than previously thought.
64 
Likewise, it should be noted that because of the extinguishing fossil fuel resources regardless 
of climate change many climate measures (such as the expansion of renewable energies) are 
and remain reasonable. Thus we have to agree to some rulings by the German Federal 
Constitutional Court holding that there is also a fundamental rights protection  against “only 
possible” impairments of fundamental rights.
65 However, it need by critically emphasized that 
the German Federal Constitutional Court has so far only abstractly recognized this idea but in 
all concrete cases decides actions de facto as if “uncertain predictions” per se led to a loss of 
fundamental  rights  protection.  For  it  regularly  grants  the  legislature  an  almost  arbitrary 
decision-making power as to whether and to what extent an action is required in cases of 
uncertain  impairments  of  fundamental  rights.  However,  in  light  of  the  above  mentioned 
arguments  in  favor  of  precaution  this  is  not  convincing.    Rather,  precaution  is  generally 
required and can only be omitted as far as the rules of balancing, which have to be discussed 
in more detail, allow. The following paragraphs will briefly introduce some of these balancing 
rules. Later on, we will determine to what extent they give rise to the obligation of a more 
demanding national and transnational climate policy. 
The well-known balancing rules of the proportionality test, appropriateness and necessity 
of a limitation of freedom in favor of the interests of other stakeholders, directly follow from 
the multipolar principle of freedom: Indeed someone’s freedom may not be limited, if it is not 
for the benefit of someone else’s freedom. Adequacy as the last step in the conventional 
proportionality test may also be understood as an umbrella over a number of other balancing 
                                                           
62 Instead of many, cf. BVerwG, Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 1995, 995 ff.; overlooked in Couzinet, 
DVBl 2008, 760 ff.; differentiating Calliess, Rechtsstaat, 244; on particularities of the discourse about hazard 
control and precaution, cf. Ekardt/ Schmidtke, Die öffentliche Verwaltung 2009, 187 ff. 
63 Cf. Ekardt/ Schmidtke, Die öffentliche Verwaltung 2009, 187 ff. (also on the further issue that the majority 
view in Germany incorrectly measures fundamental rights according to the average man, e.g., when gathering 
the facts about the risk of a pollutant it considers a 40-year average male (and thus ignores weaker people, such 
as pregnant women, elderly, or children); cf. also Böhm, Der Normmensch, 1996. 
64 Cf. with further references Ekardt, in: Pan Jiahua, Climate Change (forthcoming). 
65 Cf. German Federal Constitutional Court, Vol. (BVerfGE) 49, 89 (140 ff.); 53, 30 (57); 56, 54 (78).  
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rules, which also follow from the principle of freedom. One of those rules is that a concern 
may not evidently be set aside too unilaterally in favor of other interests. This again follows 
from the idea that freedom should be maximized in total, even though it does not rule out 
“deadly” balancing in a specific case if a conflict cannot be resolved differently. 
Another balancing rule, which can also be applied under the heading of adequacy is the 
polluter  pays  principle,  which  in  turn  follows  from  the  principle  of  freedom  itself.  For 
freedom  must  include  responsibility  for  the  foreseeable  (including  environmental) 
consequences of one’s own actions–even in other countries and in the future, and also for the 
unpleasant consequences of one's own life plan.
66 The negative consequences of an action 
which otherwise benefit me (e.g., of cheap free  movement today) must always fall back on 
me, if only by way of cost recovery for the damage created by that action. 
Yet another balancing rule is that the assumptions of underlying facts must be correct. 
Every  decision  must,  for  instance,  be  based  on  the  latest  climate  research  in  order to 
understand what dangers threaten the freedom of future generations. It is essential that facts 
are relevant material for applying a norm and determining the degree of impairment of a 
concern, but that those statements of fact as such (!) do not have a normative meaning: the 
actual danger posed by aircraft noise to the health of local residents, for example –on which 
scientific discourse and surveys can be undertaken–does not logically automatically imply 
whether and to what extent this noise must be prevented. The decision under the rules of 
balancing is thus always a political-democratic and not a scientific one.
67 In situations of 
uncertain facts such as climate change, there is also a duty to make preliminary decisions and 
to review them later. This latter rule also appears in previous case law, but again not as a 
claim  of  protection  of  fundamental  rights  but  only  as  objective  obligation.  And  in 
environmental cases it is always only proclaimed in the abstract, but never sp ecifically 
demanded.
68 This, too, deserves criticism. 
After all, the decision for or against a reasonably effective climate policy is not left to the 
discretion of majorities or sovereign states, even though this may be a widespread view. The 
common political idea that, e.g., security policy is a human rights issue but climate change is 
not,  is  inaccurate.  However,  if  balancing  is  allowed,  even  necessary,  and  regarding 
environmental law potentially fatal (e.g., even a “weaker” form of climate change will result 
                                                           
66 The polluter pays principle is indeed mentioned in, e.g., BVerfG, Vol. 115 (BVerfGE 115, 118 ff.). However, 
the recourse to this topos always appears somewhat arbitrary and not systematically derived. 
67 From a climate-is never follows an ought. It does not follow from facts what should be done in life. On the 
distinction of is and ought and the specific relevance of facts and factual uncertainty in balancing (and generally 
in legal and moral decisions) see also Ekardt/ Susnjar, Jahrbuch des Umwelt- und Technikrechts 2007, 277 ff. 
68 BVerfGE 24, 119 ff.; 3, 303 ff.; 39, 1 ff.; 39, 160 ff.; 53, 30; 77, 170 ff.; BVerfG, NJW 1996, 651; cf. also 
Meßerschmidt, Gesetzgebungsermessen, 2000.  
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in fatalities), this raises the question whether (here: environmental) fundamental rights yet do 
have an “absolute” core which is safe from any balancing
69. Article 19 paragraph 2 GG does 
not  shed  any  light  on  this  issue.  Although  this  provision  guarantees  the  substance  of 
fundamental rights, this does not necessarily mean that in every situation an absolute core of 
every fundamental right must remain for everyone.
70 German case law in turn disposes of the 
problem simply by factually inaccurately insinuating that the described problem of stochastic 
damage, which will be characteristic especially for climate change, does not exist. In any case 
it assumes that no threats could be diagnosed in “short term” (which is usually true but just 
passes  on  the  problem).
71  In the area of security law, on the other hand, the judiciary 
sometimes attests absolute, substantial minimum standards which are not subject to balancing, 
as recently illustrated in the Aviation Security Act case (the case in which the German Federal 
Constitutional Court rejected the authorization in Section 14 paragraph 3 Aviation Security 
Act to bring down planes with “innocent” passengers which are converted by terrorists into 
attack  weapons,  e.g.,  against  nuclear  power  plants).
72  At closer inspection, however, the 
normative theory of the Aviation Security Act case seems hardly justifiable and therefore not 
transferable to the law of climate protection: 
First, a striking inconsistency catches the eye: There is no way to justify that shooting 
down an aircraft with passengers who are doomed anyway should be prohibited in all (!) 
circumstances (even if doing so could avoid an–uncertain, but possible
73–worst-case scenario) 
and  the  sacrifice  at  worst  of  hundreds  of  thousands  of  people  on  the  ground  should  be 
required–and  conversely  that  the  legislature  should  have  complete  discretion,  although 
(according to the European Commission) each year 310,000 deaths from particulate matter are 
accepted, just because fellow citizens do not want to purchase somewhat more expensive cars, 
                                                           
69 Unfortunately the term “absolute” instead of “not subject to balancing” is often linguistically wrong used as a 
synonym for “universal.” As indicated in footnote ... the idea of freedom is indeed universally valid. But since all 
men have their own freedom, it does not mean that this universal freedom is an “absolute” freedom which is not 
subject to any balancing. Curiously enough, the debate on torture and absoluteness of human dignity started 
precisely on this confusion: during one of his lectures no lesser than Niklas Luhmann presented the example of 
the caught terrorist who has hidden a ticking nuclear bomb in a city to refute the universality of human rights. 
The question in this example is whether one should torture the terrorist to get the required information. 
Unfortunately, Luhmann has at best refuted the absoluteness of human rights–but has also unintentionally 
documented that the Grand Master of sociological systems theory (who liked to highlight his jurisprudential 
“background knowledge” based on his studies) is not able to keep apart basic categories of legal theory. 
70 On the controversy about Article 19 paragraph 2 GG with further references, see also Hochhuth, 
Relativitätstheorie, 150 ff. 
71 Cf. e.g. German Federal Administrative Court (BVerwG), NVwZ 2006, 1055 ff.; Vol. 87 (BVerwGE 87), 332 
(375) (regarding aircraft noise). 
72 Cf. BVerfGE 115, 118 ff.; critically, cf. Vosgerau, Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts 2008, 346 ff.; Isensee, FAZ 
v. 21.01.2008, 9; Ekardt/ Kornack, Kritische Vierteljahreszeitschrift für Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft 
2006, 349 ff.; Depenheuer, in: Depenheuer (Ed.), FS Josef Isensee, 2007, 43 ff. 
73 The fact that a possible and not only a certain impairment of fundamental rights is relevant was explicitly the 
subject of the foregoing considerations.  
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heaters, etc. with appropriate filtering techniques (also there are no serious uncertainty of 
environmental health knowledge regarding the carcinogenicity of particulates).
74 As shown 
above, the distinction of defensive and protective rights can justify these differences. The 
same holds true for the mere allegation that there was no fundamental rights protection 
against uncertain impairments.  Also  it  does  not  help  to  point  to  the  support  of  “a  broad 
parliamentary  majority”  (wherever  such  a  statement  would  fit  in  the  fundamental  rights 
dogmatic), since there is (or at least was) a broad parliamentary majority support in Germany 
and  Europe  for  both  policies,  on  particulate  matter  and  on  aviation  security.  Even  the 
principle of human dignity–despite widespread claims to that effect–does not imply a contrary 
view, as the principle of dignity on its own is neither an applicable legal norm nor could it 
grammatically  contain  the  statement  “absolute  prohibition  to  treat  someone  as  a  mere 
means.”
75 Even the somewhat helpless-looking general appeal that a society which does not 
strictly forbid certain things ignores the autonomy does not give very valuable insight. Do I 
become an autonomous individual by having a most sacred right not to be shut down in an 
airplane  and  instead  dying  30  seconds  later  in  the  crash?  There  may  indeed  be  absolute 
prohibitions of balancing. But they must be justified differently than usual. For example the 
absolute  ban  on  torture  can  probably  be  sufficiently  justifiable  considering  results  on 
freedom.
76 The recent decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court of early 2010 on 
Hartz IV is caught in the trap of seemingly  “absolute” statements which yet are incorrectly 
reasoned from the point of view of fundamental rights theory and also very vague, largely 
                                                           
74 This represents 65,000 deaths in Germany alone, cf. EU-Commission, here quoted from 
http://www.bundestag.de/aktuell/hib/2005/2005_104/01.html. 
75 The principle of human dignity itself is not a liberty/ fundamental right/ human right. Even more, this principle 
is not at all created as a norm which would apply to individual cases; not even as objective law. Human dignity 
is rather the reason–the justification–of liberties and human rights, rather than a right itself. Therefore, it directs 
the application of other norms, in this case the different spheres of freedom of those citizens concerned and 
prescribes autonomy as a guiding principle of a legal system. The “inviolability” of dignity and its nature as 
“reason” for rights which can be seen in provisions like Article 1, paragraph 2-3 GG (“therefore,” i.e. for 
dignity‘s sake, there are human rights) show that this is not only philosophically reasonable, but also evident 
from the point of view of legal interpretation. Furthermore, this finding is supported by the formulation in the 
materials on the ECFR which characterizes dignity as a “basis.” That the ECFR materials also refer to human 
dignity as a “right” has to be understood against this background that human dignity is a kind of “right to rights” 
(Enders). On the state of this discussion, see Ekardt/ Kornack, Kritische Vierteljahreszeitschrift für 
Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft 2006, 349 ff.; similarly Enders, Die Menschenwürde in der 
Verfassungsordnung, 1997; see also Vosgerau, Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts 2008, 346 ff.; fort he opposing 
view, see instead of many Böckenförde, Juristenzeitung 2003, 809 ff.– The BVerfG, too, does not claim that 
dignity is a subjective, individual right. However, the Court seems to understand dignity as an applicable legal 
standard containing a ban of treating another human being as a mere means. 
76 Incidentally, the Aviation Security Act case in BVerfG, Vol. 115, 118 ff. could perhaps still be considered a 
(barely) convincing decision, though not because of its reasoning about human dignity: Rather one could reach 
the same result in the Aviation Security Act case by arguing that a situation in which a terroristic act is (1.) 
actually detected (2.) in time is simply too unlikely to create such a law.–On the absolute ban on torture, cf. 
Ekardt, Wird die Demokratie ungerecht?, 2007, Chap. III D.  
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superable by balancing, and thus practically not helpful.
77 
Another balancing rule, which is essential for a human righ ts protection against climate 
change may be called the rule of “exceptional equality.” This balancing rule can be derived 
from  our  prior  findings,  too.  It  leads  to  the  necessity  of  equal  treatment  towards  future 
generations and people in developing countries. Substantive equality, unlike legal equality, is 
normally not a liberal-democratic basic requirement. In my opinion, in the case of climate 
change,  however,  the  consequent  application  of  the  foregoing  results  in  an  obligation  to 
globally distribute per capita emission rights equally. This “equal subsistence” specifically 
means two things: Everyone must have a minimum of energy available or must be able to 
make use of land, respectively (and the latter can be expected never to be completely free of 
GHG-emissions)–and everyone must be protected as good as possible from disastrous climate 
change, since this is essential, too. This also requires restrictions on the wealthy to raise the 
minimum for all. All this is supported by two arguments: 
  Greenhouse  gas  emissions  must  be  drastically  reduced,  while  everyone  needs  to 
release at least a certain quantity of greenhouse gases–and this makes it obvious to be careful 
with inequalities in the distribution. 
  Even more important is this: If a public good such as the climate is monetized, it 
seems plausible to distribute the “proceeds” to all as equally as possible–because here no one 
can claim for himself that he has accomplished a special “performance” in the exercise of his 
freedom to produce that good. 
 
2. Subsumption of the balancing test 
On this basis it follows that a constitutional court needed to make a fundamental rights ruling 
confirming  an  obligation  to  a  more  intensive  climate  policy.  The  German  Federal 
Constitutional Court as a national constitutional court, the ECtHR as European international 
law (quasi-)constitutional court, and the ECJ as EU law (quasi-)constitutional court would 
have to determine, if concerned with the effectiveness of climate policy, that the legislature 
has not complied with its obligations–which can be demonstrated in the form of balancing 
rules–and that it has to remedy this within a given period of time. The remedy would be to 
bring about an effective global climate policy or, in the alternative, to press ahead on climate 
policy significantly more massively as EU than previously. Merging what was previously 
worked out, the principal human rights violations of existing climate change policy are as 
follows: 
                                                           
77 Cf. BVerfG, judgment of 02/09/2010, available at 
http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/ls20100209_1bvl000109.html?Suchbegriff=Hartz+IV.  
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a) The current climate policy already disregards the balancing rule that its decisions shall 
be based on a correct factual basis: In particular, existing actions are probably erroneously 
deemed suitable to avoid the looming drastic damages from climate change. 
b) Furthermore, politics has not yet taken into account in its decision making that the 
fundamental right of freedom has also an intergenerational and global cross-border dimension 
and that, therefore, legal positions of future generations and the proverbial Bangladeshis need 
be considered in parliamentary / legal decisions.
78 
c) Furthermore, politics must embrace the polluter pays principle. This is evidently not 
yet done regarding climate protection, in particular, globally and intergenerationally. 
d) The essential right to the conditions of freedom, i.e. to subsistence (of those living 
here  and  now,  but  also  intergenerationally  and  globally)  can  at  most  be  overcome  by 
balancing in marginal areas because freedom is pointless without this physical basis. That 
right also includes a basal energy access and an at least somewhat protected stability of the 
global climate. This in turn requires drastic climate policy measures which have not been 
implemented by climate policy decisions in the past. In particular it was also not taken into 
account that the scarce remaining emissions budget would have to be distributed equally in 
the face of (aa) its scarcity and (bb) the imperative nature of at least low emissions for human 
survival. 
Against this background, we can agree to the conventional formulations of the German 
Federal  Constitutional  Court  regarding  environmental  policy–and  here  more  specifically 
climate policy. Indeed, in situations uncertain facts politics has some discretion with respect 
to estimations and balancing the various interests. Only in cases of “evident” excess should 
those democratic decisions, e.g., in Germany or the EU annulled.
79 But this can reasonably 
only mean that in cases of violations of balancing rules constitutional courts must remand the 
issue to politics for a new (climate) policy decision within the limits of the ir discretion and 
under compliance with the rules of balancing. In our context, the latter require a much more 
intensive climate policy oriented at an equal distribution per capita. As outlined in Section B., 
such a policy, however, implies greenhouse gas reduction targets of about 95% in Europe and 
about 80% worldwide until 2050. It may be left open whether the statement in d) should be 
understood to mean that climate policy must achieve exactly those targets or slightly lowered 
targets (or, in the light of later scientific findings, perhaps even higher targets). Similarly, in 
terms of the statements under c) it may be left open, whether within narrow limits there 
                                                           
78 With an (in my opinion suboptimal) ex post view at liability rather than an ex ante perspective at prevention, 
cf. Verheyen, Climate Change Damage and International Law: Prevention Duties and State Responsibility, 2006. 
79 Instead of many, cf. BVerfG, Judgment of 07/29/2009 - 1 BvR 1606/08 -, juris n. 19.  
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should (presumably) be exceptions to the polluter pays principle, as this principle has not at 
all been complied with in climate policy so far. In any case, when faced with such actions, 
constitutional courts must require parliaments to create new climate policies to prevent the 
highlighted violations of balancing rules in the future. 
In any case, the allegation that the current national and transnational climate policies 
were quite comprehensive does not refute the fundamental rights violation by existing climate 
policy  diagnosed  above.  For  existing  climate  policy  is  not  sufficiently  adequate  to  the 
magnitude of climate problems as was documented in the statements at the beginning of the 
study. Moreover, those protected by human rights cannot be referred to (a) the possibility of 
more  ambitious  climate  protection  treaties  in  the  future  which  supposedly  rendered 
constitutional court rulings on climate policy unnecessary today. Their claims also cannot be 
objected by stating that (b) a purely national or European approach could not solve the global 
climate problem. For (a) does not appear sufficiently probable to justify a further delay. And 
(b) is simply wrong, as the potential is ignored, to gradually spread an ambitious European 
climate policy globally by combining it with border adjustments, as was outlined elsewhere. 
Similarly, the insights gained are also arguments against the assumption that measures 
which perpetuate the existing energy system conform to fundamental rights. This applies, e.g., 
to the continuation of lignite use by the approval of new opencast mines, the continuation of 
coal subsidies and the construction of new coal power plants. It must be considered, however, 
that an effective climate policy ultimately deals not so much with the prevention of individual 
plants but rather with a whole different approach. In principle, it is in fact up to the legislature 
to  decide  how  to  achieve  those  climate  objectives  which  are  derived  from  the  rules  of 
balancing. 
The preceding arguments indicated that a duty to stronger climate change policies can be 
derived at a national, European and international level. One could consider, however, that a 
violation of the constitution could be prevented by an interpretation of the applicable climate 
protection  laws  in  conformity  with  fundamental  rights,  i.e.,  by  a  stricter  interpretation  of 
existing law rather than a creation of new law. However, obviously this does not solve the 
problem. For a constitutional interpretation of laws may not go beyond their clear terms. For 
instance, it is not possible to derive stricter targets from the current EU-ETS or the Kyoto 
Protocol.  Instead,  as  long  as  the  legislature  does  not  act  or  is  not  obliged  to  act  by  a 
constitutional court’s decision, only in marginal areas where the formulations of the laws are 
broad  one  can  use  a  constitutional  requirement  to  apply  the  most  “climate  friendly”  
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interpretation in order to bring fundamental rights to bear as good as possible.
80 
A final point shall be no ted: The issue of the existence and scope of fundamental 
protection  rights  is  neglected  in  the  environmental  discussion  in  favor  of  a  total  of  a 
permanent debate on environmental class actions.
81 Even beyond provisions which allow the 
curing of violations or make them irrelevant and thereby often prevent a real substantive 
success of such actions, environmental class actions  and individual rights to sue are only as 
strong as the underlying substantive law. However, below the constitution, the latter is often 
neither  sufficiently  strong,  as  can  be  seen  from  the  still  dubious  environmental  and 
particularly  climate  policy  related  overall  balance  of  Western  societies.  Nor  can 
administrative court actions  for compliance with  simple laws–no matter whether they are 
brought by environmental groups or individuals–solve another basic problem of environment 
protection:  the  creeping  disappearance  of  environmental  concerns  through  balancing  in 
seemingly “unimportant individual cases,” where in their entirety they add up to a use of 
resources and climate in Europe which is indeed not permanently and globally viable and ergo 
is not sustainable. This is where a revised interpretation of fundamental rights, as developed 
above,  strengthens  substantive  law  in  a  way  that  class  actions  alone  can  not  provide  (in 
addition, the financial and human capacity of associations, to actually bring class actions, is 
notoriously overestimated by friend and foe). For fundamental  rights  can demand stricter 
substantive law or bring about such law through appropriate interpretation. 
 
IV. Judicial Review 
Up to this point it has been shown that there are constitutionally compelling arguments for 
stronger national and transnational climate protection. At its core this is true regardless of 
whether we apply national fundamental rights (which would have to be claimed before the 
national constitutional court), EU fundamental rights (which belong under the jurisdiction of 
the ECJ
82), or fundamental rights under international law (for the geographical area of Europe 
the ECtHR would have jurisdiction). For the basic international structures parallel those 
national structures. Because of the human rights basis of the argument in this essay it is 
ultimately not limited to Europe but applies worldwide. However, du e to the absence of an 
international human rights court there is no instance where a specific action could be brought. 
                                                           
80 Some further effects of this new approach on administrative law are discussed in Ekardt, Die Verwaltung 
2010, Beiheft 11 (forthcoming) (introducing, e.g., enhanced standing in administrative court actions and the 
possibility of enforcing precautionary limits). 
81 On the following in more detail, cf. Ekardt/ Schenderlein, Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 2008, 1059 
ff. 
82 This is possible only through the detour of Treaty infringement proceedings or proceedings for a preliminary 
ruling.  
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However,  the  statements  in  this  study  are  indirectly  relevant  to  other  international 
jurisdictions, such as the WTO courts. 
Following the position developed above, every individual, perhaps correctly even those 
outside Germany, would be a potential claimant. For the future climate change addressed in 
the opening chapter will hit humanity as a whole, and not just individuals. Therefore, at least 
every younger citizen (although an exact age limit cannot easily be specified) can plausibly 
claim that his human rights will be affected in the future by an insufficient climate policy. In 
any case, the reasoning of this study should have explained that there is no rule providing that 
human rights can only be claimed if only individuals and not many or even all humans are 
affected. Since climate change will probably affect future generations and people in many 
developing countries considerably more drastic, these groups, too, are in principle potential 
claimants. Of course, German and European law still lacks a provision on third part standing 
that would allow representatives to bring actions to preserve those rights today–when they can 
still have real effects– even though future generations (naturally) do not have the ability to be 
present themselves.
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83 In my opinion it is quite obvious as an alternative in this context to recognize case law third party standing so 
that those living today could turn to the courts at least with the request that the legislature should be obliged to 
create appropriate third party standing. 